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Ramsi A. Woodcock*
I. Legal Reasoning as a Renaissance Habit of Mind
The great evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould devoted his last book to the relationship between science
and the humanities.[1] Gould argued that the Renaissance was not the forward-looking launcher of the
scienti c revolution that many, inspired by the careful observations of nature in the work of Leonardo Da Vinci,
believe it to be, but a backward-looking enterprise.[2] The Renaissance sought to restore the learning of the
ancients rather than to advance scienti c knowledge through observation of the natural world.[3] Gould gives
the example of the “Historia animalium” of Ulisse Aldrovandi and Konrad Gesner, the greatest natural historians
of the period.[4] That book includes chapters on the elk and the fox, but also on the unicorn and the satyr, not,
as Gould is quick to point out, because Aldrovandi and Gesner necessarily thought that unicorns and satyrs
exist, but because the ancients had written about those creatures.[5] The Renaissance was oriented toward
ancient intellectual authority, not toward the observable world.[6] As Gould puts it, “for the Renaissance, the

recovery of ancient wisdom, not the discovery of novel data, became the primary task of scholarship.”[7] Gould
goes on to detail how in the seventeenth century science moved on to focus on reality.[8] The law, however, had
to wait another three hundred years to make this move, and in important respects is still waiting.
The Renaissance character of legal studies is one of the most jarring aspects of legal education for American
students, who, unlike law students in most other parts of the world, commence their study of law after four
years of undergraduate education in other elds of intellectual endeavor.[9] The practice of law to this day is
often not oriented toward the observation of reality but toward the observation of legal texts, their
categorization and systematization in relation to each other, rather than in relation to the world.[10] The
undergraduate major in economics of course learns mathematical models that may be horribly divorced from
reality and utterly incapable of answering the pressing economic questions of the day. But the key difference
between this experience and that of the law student is that the economic models learned by the undergraduate
economics student are supposed to re ect reality, however badly they may in fact do that.[11] Even the
undergraduate major in comparative literature, who primarily studies chains of authorial in uences — can hints
of Heraclitus be found in Rabelais? — engages in a course of study that is oriented toward observed fact, even
if texts themselves are the subjects of observation. Either there is Heraclitus in Rabelais or there is not.
By contrast, new law students quickly nd that what matters in the law is “legal argument,” the drawing of
analogies to past cases, rather than argument based on observed fact, on the relationship between particular
case outcomes and the world.[12] Getting the case right does not mean identifying the effects of a set of
possible rulings on the nation and deciding whether those effects are desirable according to some metric,
whether that metric be justice, the carrying out of the expectations of the legislature, or something else.[13]
Getting the case right means nding the outcome that best ts past cases, preferably those decided by courts
or judges with the greatest prestige.[14] The law in the rst instance appears to the new law student not as a
system to be back-tested against the world but to be back-tested against itself.[15] In order to solve cases, the
law student dives into the law library, which collects reports of past court decisions, not into the university’s
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main library, which collects works devoted to describing the real world. Just so, the Renaissance naturalist dove
into ancient manuscripts to describe the natural world, not into the nearest lake.
No wonder American law students experience their rst year of legal studies as exceptionally di cult and nd
their undergraduate performance little guide to their performance on rst-year law exams. These students have
spent their entire intellectual lives in the Enlightenment, excelling by showing their teachers that they have a
better grasp on reality than their classmates.[16] But in law school that skill matters not at all. For some, the
result is a crisis of motivation, because they have grown up associating the pursuit of reality with self-worth.
For others, it is a moral crisis, as they nd legal reasoning leading them to support case outcomes that they
believe will be bad for the world. They are taught, however, that accepting that law and justice are two different
things is key to joining the profession.[17] For still other students, the crisis is one of skills. They may have been
very good at arguing from reality in their prior intellectual lives; all at once, they must learn the very different
skill of arguing from authority.
The Renaissance character of legal reasoning gives new law students, and the lawyers they go on to become,
unique insight into the intellectual battles of the past, albeit insight they could do without. Gould wrote of the
Renaissance that “[w]e often get befuddled when we try to comprehend the central belief of the system that the
Scienti c Revolution hoped to replace, because [argument from authority] strikes us as so strange and
archaic[.]”[18] But to the seasoned lawyer, Aldrovandi and Gesner’s approach to natural history is perfectly
familiar: there is no better way to win a case than to show that a very important court said something
supportive, and the greater the number of courts, and the further back in time that support can be shown to
stretch, the stronger the authority still. It does not matter if the result is bad for America or the world, or
something that actual legislators, not the abstract “intent of the legislature” to which courts refer in doing legal
reasoning, could not possibly have wanted.[19] The fact that other cases support the outcome is enough. The
sixteenth century is alive and well in the law.

II. Legal Realism as Policymaking
For at least a hundred years now, the legal realist movement has contested the Renaissance approach to the
law by insisting that legal argumentation always be reality-based.[20] The question in deciding any case, insist
the legal realists, is always what those who framed the law — that is, legislators — would actually want to have
happen in the particular case, or, in matters of common law, what the best result would be after taking
consequences into account.[21] That is, realists want courts to do what everyone else in government already
does: make policy. The term “policy” evokes armies of PhDs in subjects like sociology, environmental science,
government, and, above all, economics, working for think tanks, administrative agencies, or the science
departments of universities, gathering data and making recommendations about what the President or
Congress should do. What the term “policy” does not invoke is the court or the law school. Policy is modern
governance, in contrast to the Renaissance governance that is still the staple of the law.[22]
The fact that policy is generally associated with institutions other than the courts and law schools re ects how
society has dealt with the failure of legal practice to adapt to science: by pushing the legal world aside. It is no
coincidence that the rise of the legal realist movement a hundred years ago coincided with the dawn of the
administrative state.[23] The legal realist movement and the movement to out ank the law with policy
institutions was one and the same.[24] Legal realists wanted judges to get real, and seeing that they would not,
sought to take governance outside of the realm of the courts and place it in the hands of administrative
agencies staffed with people educated into reality-based intellectual disciplines, people with PhDs, not JDs.[25]
The legal realists have created a policy world outside of the law that has vastly more in uence today over how
the country is run than do courts and their method of legal reasoning. Today federal legislation is pervasive and
state statutes have greatly circumscribed the ambit of the common law, from the Uniform Commercial Code,
which extracted vast swaths of commercial law from the common law power of the courts, to the more recent
tort reform push to reduce the law of punitive damages to statute.[26] Indeed, the federal courts today defer to
the vast majority of administrative agency decisions explicitly on the ground that the judiciary lacks the
expertise to review them.[27] But this was not always so.
Nineteenth century America was ruled by courts; legislation was uncommon, narrow, and subject to searching
judicial review.[28] Nowhere is the change wrought by legal realism on judicial power starker than in the mostlyforgotten history of judicial review of price regulation by administrative agencies.[29] The Supreme Court
grudgingly conceded power to Congress to create price-regulating administrative agencies in Munn v. Illinois in
1877, but for more than 50 years starting in 1890 the Court insisted on supervising the prices those regulators
set.[30] In case after case, the Court sought to use legal reasoning to determine whether the price of electricity,
tap water, or whatever other product was before the court, met a standard of fairness that the Court found in
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[31] After decades of withering criticism from the legal realists,
however, the Court nally quit the eld in 1944, conceding that price setting by precedent should give way to
reality-based price setting carried out by experts — economists — trained in understanding markets.[32] Every

similar retreat of the courts from constitutional review of regulatory activity over the past century has been a
victory for legal realism, for the policymaker over the lawyer.[33]
But unless the administrative state succeeds at doing away with the judiciary entirely, the triumph of legal
realism will be complete only if it transforms the way judges do law. In this, legal realism has had mixed
success. The realists did take legal scholarship more or less by storm, convincing elite law professors that they
should never push for a change in the law, or a particular resolution of a pending case, without deploying policy
arguments in support.[34] Renaissance-style scholarly pursuits, such as the writing of immense treatises
collating all of the cases relating to a particular branch of the law, have ceased to occupy law professors at the
best schools.[35] “Law and . . . ” scholarly sub elds have proliferated, as law scholars have sought to import
various reality-oriented intellectual disciplines, from literature to sociology, into the law.[36]
Perhaps the most important of the “law and . . .” sub elds has been law and economics, which appeared in two
distinct phases.[37] The rst was a project of the original group of legal realists, most notably Robert Hale, that
sought to push the courts aside rather than reform them.[38] The great triumph of this rst law and economics
movement was convincing the Supreme Court to get out of the rate regulation business by showing how badly
adapted legal reasoning was to deciding what a fair price might be.[39] The second movement, which started in
the 1950s, was oriented to the internal reform task of replacing legal reasoning with reality-based economic
reasoning.[40] This second iteration should probably be credited with doing more to compel law scholars to
focus on results than any other single effort to open the law up to the reality-based intellectual world.[41] But its
success has been limited by the shortcomings of economics as a social science. Despite its orientation toward
reality, economics ignores large categories of human behavior that ought to be relevant to a scienti c approach
to law, because economics assumes that all economic actors are rational and have static preferences.[42]
Nonetheless, every time a law professor, in uenced by economics, argues that the parties to a case will
contract around controlling precedent, or that a rule will distort economic incentives, the professor accepts that
consequences matter, even if the professor makes no effort to undertake a careful study of those
consequences.[43] Law and economics has in this way been a victory for realism.
It would be a big mistake to infer from the realist success in the realm of legal scholarship a similar triumph in
legal practice. The primary currency of argumentation in the world of legal practice remains the analogy from
past cases, with more legal realist approaches appearing only occasionally, and then only in the most elite
courts in the most important cases.[44] Precedent continues to matter, not because it helps courts determine
what the best outcome for America might be, or because the consequences of a lack of consistency in case
handling would be bad for the nation — both acceptable realist approaches to precedent — but because
precedent came before, just as the unicorn mattered for the Renaissance naturalist, because it came before.
[45]

III. Mossoff on Trademark

A. His Argument
It is against this backdrop of the continuing contestation of realism in the law that Mossoff’s argument that
trademark is a property right must be evaluated.[46] Mossoff argues that courts and commentators have
tended to deny trademark the status of property because they have failed to analogize trademarks to
easements, which permit owners of real property limited access to neighbors’ land.[47] According to Mossoff,
trademarks, like easements, are linked to ownership of something else.[48] For trademarks, it is ownership of
the business associated with the mark in the minds of consumers.[49] For easements, it is ownership of the
real property to which the easement provides access.[50] According to Mossoff, because courts rely on the
contingency of easements on a property right to accord easements themselves the status of property, courts
should rely on the contingency of trademarks on property in a business to accord trademarks the status of
property as well.[51]

B. The Missing Consequences
Mossoff’s paper will serve to remind realists of just how bad legal scholarship was before it embraced reality.
For the paper argues a legal question over nearly forty long pages with nary a word about legal consequences,
let alone what those legal consequences might mean for Americans out in the real world.[52] Treating
trademarks as property based on their connection to ownership of the underlying business could suggest to
courts that trademarks protect the value of consumer loyalty to that underlying business rather than serving, as
the courts believe them to today, to prevent consumer confusion of brands.[53] The concept of genericide,
which eliminates trademark protection when a mark like “escalator” comes to be associated by consumers with
an entire product category rather than a particular brand, could disappear, for example, because genericide
undoubtedly reduces the value of a rm’s mark.[54] The likely result would be greater market power for rms
with successful brands, for good or ill.[55]

Mossoff wants to win this debate without any discussion of the policy consequences, of whether ironclad
protection of reputation is in fact good or bad for markets. But what Americans care about is whether
protecting brand loyalty is good or bad for consumers. Protecting brand loyalty might be good for consumers
because it allows rms to reap rewards from investing in the production of better products. Or protecting brand
loyalty might be bad for consumers because it magni es the power of seductive advertising or the familiarity
generated by having been rst to market to create irrational brand attachments, leading to higher prices and
harm to more-innovative but less-well-known competitors.[56] Legal realism demands that the debate over
trademarks be carried out in these terms, in terms of effects. Mossoff would resolve the entire question based
on an analogy to the law governing whether a farmer can use a neighbor’s eld to get to the road. Because a
court once said the farmer could get to the road, Mossoff would say that a trademark can never be set aside so
long as it remains valuable to its owner.[57] Just so, the Renaissance scientist looked to Hesiod rather than the
hills for information about the natural world.

C. Indeterminacy
The failure of legal reasoning to take account of consequences, of which Mossoff’s paper is an example, is
damning enough. But the realist critique of legal reasoning always goes further, to show that legal reasoning
not only fails to take the real world into account, but cannot even provide courts with clear guidance about how
to resolve cases.[58] Legal reasoning, argue the realists, is more like rhetoric than mathematics.[59] For the
realist, legal reasoning lacks the determinacy of mathematics because, looked at from the right angle, anything
can be analogized to anything else. Trademarks are like easements in that they are both contingent on
ownership of something else, but they are also like turtles in that they both start with the letter “T.” The only way
to really win an argument through legal reasoning is therefore to assume your conclusion.[60] Mossoff cannot
argue that trademark is property because trademark rights happen to have a structure (existence contingent on
ownership of a piece of property) that resembles the structure of some other rights that the law treats as
genuine property rights. If the law does not actually say that trademark is property — and it cannot because
Mossoff’s purpose is to ll that silence with his legal reasoning — then the fact that trademarks merely
resemble rights that have been designated as property rights tells nothing about whether trademark rights
should be treated as genuine property rights.[61] The resemblance just poses the question whether there
should be a rule saying that everything that resembles a property right is a property right. If the argument is that
yes, there should be such a rule, then an argument must be made for why that rule should be adopted, returning
the argument more or less to where it started, which was to nd a way to argue from existing law to the need
for recognition of a new rule of law that resolves the question whether trademark should be treated as property.
To his credit, Mossoff’s target is an equally specious example of legal reasoning: the argument that trademark

cannot be property because it does not resemble other property rights.[62] That textbook take on the
relationship between trademark and property holds that trademark rights are not property because their
limitation to use in conjunction with the underlying business makes them unlike basic property rights, which, on
this telling, do not have any limits on use.[63] But just as resemblance cannot be used to make a property right,
non-resemblance cannot be used to deny a property right. Neither resolves the question without assuming its
conclusion. The re of legal reasoning cannot be fought with the re of more legal reasoning. The true realist
approach would be to ask whether making trademarks count as property would be good for America and to
proceed to treat trademarks as property if the answer is yes.
Of course, the realists’ beloved policy analysis is just as exible, and determinate, as legal reasoning.[64]
Considering the consequences of laws never actually de nitively resolves the question what the correct law
should be.[65] That requires the addition of a rule of decision, a value system such as human rights, or
maximization of social welfare in the economic sense.[66] The position of the realists, however, is that legal
reasoning is no more exact, no more determinate, than policy analysis.[67] As between two approaches that are
equally open to interpretation, the realists would choose the one that is informed by reality. After a bout of legal
reasoning, the lawyer ends up without an airtight argument for any particular result, plus no sense of what any
particular result would mean for the country.[68] At least with legal realism, the lawyer obtains a sense of the
consequences, and that in turn gives the lawyer a feeling for which outcome might be best.

D. Confusion about Realism
Mossoff mistakenly associates the textbook case against trademark as property — the specious argument that
because trademark does not resemble other property rights it cannot itself be a property right — with legal
realism.[69] He sees the realists in the textbook case because he mistakenly believes that the realists de ne
property as a plenary right of control — absolute dominion — over the owned thing, a position Mossoff
associates with the phrase “right to exclude.”[70] If a right must have that plenary character in order to be a
property right, then it follows immediately that the limited right to use marks that is conferred by trademark law
is not a property right.[71]

But the view of property Mossoff attributes to the realists could not be more different from the realists’ actual
view, because the view he attributes to the realists is the very same view that the realists attacked, and
demolished, a hundred years ago.[72] Nineteenth century courts used the view of property as conferring
absolute dominion over a thing to resist realist attempts to shift governance to administrative agencies.[73]
The courts argued that all administrative action deprives owners of their property, in violation of the due
process protection for property contained in the U.S. Constitution.[74] The view of property as absolute
dominion allowed the courts to argue that when a rate regulator xed a price for a good, for example, the
owner’s property rights were violated because those rights extended to all uses of the good, including the
choice of the price to charge for the good’s sale.[75] The realists fought back with the now-familiar argument
that property rights are whatever the courts want them to be.[76] The courts could just as easily de ne property
not to include a right to set the price as to de ne it to include a right to set the price.[77] The concept of
property did not require that the courts view rate regulation as a deprivation of property. In the view of the
realists, the courts were free to choose the de nition of property with the best consequences for America, and
in the realists’ view that was the de nition that would facilitate administrative action.
The realists’ attacks on the view of property as absolute dominion is also the origin of the famous realist view
of property as a bundle of rights.[78] The point of the bundle metaphor was that a regulator could break
property down into pieces, take out the pieces that were preventing the regulator from operating, and then
bundle the remaining pieces back together, without the bundle ceasing to add up to property.[79] A true realist
would never argue that the contingency of trademark rights on ownership of the underlying business means
that trademarks cannot be property because, for the realist, the contingency of the trademark right just means
that the bundle of rights that is a trademark lacks a few of the sticks that make up absolute dominion over the
owned thing. But, for the realist, that alone is no more reason to deny trademark the property moniker than it is
to grant trademark the property moniker.

IV. Conclusion
Mossoff can be forgiven for confusing the textbook case against trademark as property for realism because
today many scholars take for granted that realism dominates scholarship.[80] It would seem to follow that the
textbook view must be a realist view. The fact that the textbook view is instead of the Renaissance variety is a
measure of the extent to which the legal realist project remains un nished in the law, and scholars on both
sides of the trademark debate who should know better continue to engage in legal reasoning. Despite the
immense practical importance of intellectual property law, and the rich body of reality-based economic and
social scienti c scholarship devoted to intellectual property issues, the legal study of intellectual property law
today remains perhaps more mired in the Renaissance, in Felix Cohen’s “heaven of legal concepts,” than any
other area of legal scholarship.[81] The debate over whether trademark is property provides but a glimpse of
the problem. But that is a story for another day.
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